IFS Cloud security · Permission sets and segregation of duties
IFS Cloud permission sets an auditor can trace from role to grant
An auditor asks which rule gave a specific person a specific right. If your permission sets were cloned from colleagues, nobody can answer, and the finding returns every year. Audit-ready permission sets in IFS Cloud are built from business roles, use the grant structure IFS already provides, and are checked against a conflict matrix before anyone is given access.
Key takeaways
- A cloned permission set copies every grant the source user held, with no record of why each grant exists, so the copy cannot be defended in an audit.
- IFS Cloud lets you build Functional Role permission sets as building blocks and grant only End-User Role sets to users or user groups. That split is the basis of a role model you can explain.
- Segregation of Duties Analysis in IFS Cloud reports users who hold conflicting Functional Areas, but a conflict "will not have any impact on the access rights of the user". Removing the conflict is a design job.
- Permission sets grant projections, entities and actions, not single fields. Hiding a field in Page Designer changes the page, not the access.
- The evidence an auditor accepts comes from the model: role catalogue, conflict matrix, analysis results and dated review records.
Permission sets in IFS Cloud become an audit problem when they are copied from people instead of designed from processes. The system keeps working, users can do their jobs, and the problem only shows when an ISO 27001 or SOC 2 reviewer asks you to prove that users cannot do anything else. This article covers the design side: where excess access comes from, how to structure roles with the IFS grant structure, how to define and test conflicts, and what to hand the auditor. Running the periodic review itself is covered step by step in the IFS Cloud user access review guide.
1.Where excess access in IFS Cloud comes from
Excess access in IFS Cloud starts when a new user is set up by copying an existing one. The new buyer receives every permission set the experienced buyer collected across role changes and temporary go-live tasks, and nothing in the copy marks which grants were deliberate. After a few years, two sets with similar names grant different things and a set named after a job title no longer matches the job.
The practical test takes one question per grant: which business process requires it? If the honest answer is "it was on the user we copied", the grant cannot be defended, and neither can the model around it.
Standing administrative access
Administrative access granted to unblock a go-live tends to stay, because removing it requires someone to work out what the holder really needs and nobody is assigned that work. An account with administrative rights holds both sides of every conflict pair, so it defeats segregation of duties as a whole. The same concentration shows up when one key user leaves, which is described in The Handover That Never Happened.
What this costs at each release
A permission set is a collection of grants against projections and other objects, and IFS Cloud releases change projections. When each role has a documented list of the projections it needs, you can check a release against the roles it touches. When sets carry inherited grants nobody can explain, every grant has to be rechecked or left alone on trust. The same logic applies to code in the IFS Cloud upgrade readiness checklist.
2.How to structure roles with the IFS Cloud grant structure
IFS Cloud defines a permission set as "a collection of access grants assigned to objects and privileges", and the permission set overview in the 25R1 documentation lists what it covers: projections, reports, lobbies, workflows, database tasks and task chains, plus system privileges. Pages depend on projections for data and actions, so the projection grant is what decides access.
Functional roles as building blocks, end-user roles as assignments
The grant structure lets you build one permission set out of others. IFS distinguishes Functional Role sets, which hold the grants for one piece of a process, and End-User Role sets, which collect functional roles into a job. The documentation states that "A collection of functional roles can be added to the structure of end-user roles", and that end-user roles can be granted directly to users or user groups. A workable design grants users only end-user roles:
- List the business roles the company runs. Accounts payable clerk, purchasing buyer, warehouse supervisor, maintenance technician, credit controller. Write each in business language with an owner in the business.
- Build functional roles per process step. For example supplier invoice entry, purchase order handling, stock counting. Each holds only the projections and actions that step needs.
- Build one shared base role. Access with no segregation risk, such as the general lobbies every employee uses, goes into one set every user receives. It is reviewed once, not per person.
- Compose end-user roles. Each end-user role is the base plus the functional roles of one job, and it is the only thing granted to a user.
This structure turns "why can this person do that" into a short answer: the right sits in a named functional role, that role sits in a named end-user role, and the end-user role maps to a documented job.
Row-level scope comes after the role
Data Access Control restricts which rows a user sees through Access Control Lists, and the 25R1 Data Access Control considerations give the same advice for that layer: "Avoid direct user-based policies: Design ACLs based on roles and entities like admin, project, etc." The same page notes that "Access Control Lists (ACLs) are enforced solely for APIs", so a user reaching data by another route, such as a direct database connection, can see a different result. Decide the role first, then narrow the rows.
3.How to define and test segregation of duties in IFS Cloud
Segregation of duties exists only if no single user holds both sides of a defined conflict, whatever the policy document says. Write the conflict pairs down before you build the sets. The pairs to define first are those where one person could move money or stock without a second party:
- creating or changing a supplier, and authorising a payment to a supplier;
- entering a supplier invoice, and posting to the general ledger;
- adjusting stock, and approving a shipment;
- changing employee master data, and running payroll.
Functional Areas and the Segregation of Duties Analysis
IFS Cloud has a built-in tool for testing these pairs. According to the 25R2 Functional Area configuration page, "A Functional Area is defined by a set of security objects": projections, projection actions, projection entities and entity actions. You define which Functional Areas conflict and give each conflict a severity, Warning or Not Allowed. The Segregation of Duties Analysis, opened from Solution Manager under Users and Permissions, "shows all conflicted users that have access to different areas".
One sentence on that page decides how you present the tool to an auditor: "A conflict is only information that the security setup violates the segregation of duties rules. It will not have any impact on the access rights of the user." A conflict marked Not Allowed is still granted. The analysis is a detective control that shows the problem. Removing the conflict is done by changing the role design, or by recording an exception with a compensating control, an owner and a review date when a small team cannot separate the duty.
What to hand the auditor
| Audit requirement | Where it lives in IFS Cloud | Evidence you hand over |
|---|---|---|
| Identification | IFS IAM with the corporate identity provider, for example Microsoft Entra ID through OpenID Connect identity brokering | Sign-in records from the identity provider |
| Authorisation | End-user role permission sets composed of functional roles | Role catalogue with the owner and purpose of each role, and the user-to-role list |
| Segregation of duties | Functional Area conflicts and the Segregation of Duties Analysis | Conflict matrix, analysis result, and the register of accepted exceptions |
| Accountability | History Log configuration on the tables in scope | Logged old and new values of changed columns |
| Review cadence | Your access review procedure | Dated review records naming the approver |
The last column decides the audit. A control you run but cannot show counts as a control you do not have. For the accountability row, the History Log configuration is set per table or column with Log Insert, Log Update and Log Delete, and on update both the old and the new value are logged.
4.Why hiding a field in Page Designer is not a security control
Permission sets in IFS Cloud grant projections, entities and actions, and none of those is a single field. Asked whether one field on a form can be blocked by permission set, an IFS Community answer was that "it's not possible using security settings"; the workaround offered used Page Designer and page contexts. Page Designer decides what the page shows. If the user holds the projection grant, the data behind the page is still available through the projection, which is the same interface integrations and reports use over OData.
The rule that follows: decide what a role may read by its projection grants, and treat page layout as a usability decision taken afterwards. Test it with an account that holds only the role in question, calling the projection directly, before go-live rather than after the first audit. The same projection-level reasoning is behind read-only OData monitoring for IFS Cloud: what the API returns is the real boundary.
Mobile apps and offline data
Data synchronised to a mobile app is also controlled by permission sets. The 25R1 synchronization rules page states that the Security Group of an entity must be "granted to the mobile app user via a Permission Set for the Entity to be synchronized", and Permission Set Filters can narrow which rows go to the device. A technician's role should therefore carry the work order data the job needs and nothing that lets financial or HR entities synchronise.
Leaver handling is a control that has to be tested, not assumed. When sign-in runs through the corporate identity provider, disabling the identity there ends access only if no other credential path to IFS Cloud exists. Run the leaver path once with a test identity before go-live.
5.When to design permission sets, and who does it
Permission set design belongs before data migration and go-live. User and role data loaded into a model nobody designed carries old access straight into the new environment, so a fresh implementation starts with the same debt. A designed role model also makes onboarding an assignment: a new accounts payable clerk receives one end-user role and can start work, because the decision about that role was taken once and recorded.
Automation runs under the access model too. Workflows are granted through permission sets, so an automated step on an over-permissioned account extends that exposure. Keeping the core and its access model predictable is the same discipline described in Clean Core in IFS Cloud: Purchasing & Inventory.
If you have an open access finding or an audit date coming, the IFS Cloud Security Consulting service for permission sets and SoD covers this work: an assessment of the current permission sets that reads data and changes nothing, role design with your process owners, a Segregation of Duties matrix with a remediation order and a compensating-control register, and a review procedure your team runs alone. I do not certify compliance; your auditor does.
6.Frequently asked questions
What is the difference between a functional role and an end-user role in IFS Cloud?
In IFS Cloud a functional role is a permission set holding the grants for one part of a process, and an end-user role is a permission set that collects functional roles into a job. IFS Cloud documentation states that end-user roles can be granted directly to users or user groups, and that functional roles are added to the structure of end-user roles. Granting users only end-user roles keeps every grant traceable to a documented job.
Does the Segregation of Duties Analysis in IFS Cloud block conflicting access?
No. The Segregation of Duties Analysis in IFS Cloud reports users who hold conflicting Functional Areas, with a severity of Warning or Not Allowed, but the documentation states that a conflict has no impact on the user's access rights. The conflicting access is removed by changing the permission set design, or kept as a documented exception with a compensating control.
Can Microsoft Entra ID manage IFS Cloud roles?
Microsoft Entra ID handles sign-in to IFS Cloud: IFS IAM authenticates with external OpenID Connect identity providers through identity brokering. Authorisation stays in IFS Cloud, where permission sets decide which projections and actions a user may reach. Disabling the Entra ID account ends access only if no separate credential path into IFS Cloud exists.
If a field is hidden in Page Designer, is it secure in IFS Cloud?
No. Page Designer in IFS Cloud changes what a page displays, while permission sets grant projections, entities and actions rather than single fields. A user who holds the projection grant can still retrieve the data through the projection, for example over OData. What a role may read has to be decided by its projection grants.
Which segregation of duties conflicts should be defined first in IFS Cloud?
Define first the pairs where one IFS Cloud user could move money or stock without a second person: supplier creation with payment authorisation, supplier invoice entry with general ledger posting, stock adjustment with shipment approval, and employee master data changes with payroll. Build them as Functional Area conflicts and run the Segregation of Duties Analysis against the finished roles.
7.About the author
Dariusz Myśliwiec: 18 years hands-on with IFS (Apps 7.5 to 10 and IFS Cloud). IFS Certified Associate Consultant. PRINCE2® 7. Independent practice based in Kraków, delivered remotely across Europe and globally. You talk to the consultant who does the work, not a sales layer.
Selected clients from my IFS work: Fugro · LGC · BVI Medical · Betafence (PRÆSIDIAD) · Barlinek · NGK Ceramics · Newag · Oleofarm.
IFS is a registered trademark of IFS AB; this practice is not affiliated with IFS AB.
Would your permission sets survive the next audit?
Pick one conflict pair, such as supplier creation and payment authorisation, and list the users who hold both sides. If that list takes more than a quick query, the model is the problem. The security service starts with an assessment that reads your permission sets and changes nothing in IFS Cloud.
See IFS Cloud Security Consulting Read: IFS Cloud user access review

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